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Federal Income T a x a t i o n - D ~ s ~ ~ ~ oOFwSURTAX
~ ~ c ~EXEMPTION
BROTHER-SISTER
CORPORATIONS-STOCK
OWNERSHIP
TEST
UNDERSECTIONS
1551 AND 1563-Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va.,
Inc. v. Commissioner, [I977 Adv. Sh.] STAND.FED. TAXREP.
(CCH) (77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 86,250) fi 9163 (4th Cir. Jan. 28,1977),
rev'g per curium, 65 T.C. 798 (1976).
TO

William Herbert owned all of the stock of Fairfax Auto Parts,
Inc. (FAP), and 55 percent of the outstanding stock of Fairfax
Auto Parts of Northern Virginia, Inc. (NOVA). The remaining
stock of NOVA was owned by Joseph Ofano. In computing their
respective tax liabilities for 1971 and 1972, NOVA and FAP each
used a full surtax exemption of $25,000, pursuant to section l l ( d )
of the Internal Revenue Code.' The Commissioner of Internal
Revenue determined that NOVA and FAP were component members of a brother-sister controlled group as defined by section
1563(a)2and therefore were entitled to only one surtax exemption.
1. Unless otherwise indicated, all references to "Code" or "section(s)" refer to the
Internal Revenue Code of 1954, as amended.
2. I.R.C. § 1563(a):purposes of this part, the
GROUPOF CORPORATIONS.-For
(a) CONTROLLED
term "controlled group of corporations" means any group of-

....
(2) BROTHER-SISTER
CONTROLLED GROUP.-TWO
or more corporations if 5 or
fewer persons who are individuals, estates, or trusts own . . . stock possessing(A) at least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all
classes of stock entitled to vote or at least 80 percent of the total value
of shares of all classes of the stock of each corporation, and
(B) more than 50 percent of the total combined voting power of
all classes of stock entitled to vote or more than 50 percent of the total
value of shares of all classes of stock of each corporation, taking into
account the stock ownership of each such person only to the extent
such stock ownership is identical with respect to each such corporation.

.,..
The application of the 80-percent and 50-percent tests is illustrated in the following
examples:
Example (1). If A owns 55% of Corporation Y and 45% of Corporation 2 , and B owns
35% of Y and 40% of 2, the two tests would apply as follows:
Percent of Identical
Percentage of Stock
Ownership
Ownership
Y
z
Shareholder:

A

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total

. . . . . . . . . . .

90

85

80

As the table illustrates, A and B together own 90% of Y and 85% of 2. Thus, the basic
80-percent ownership test is met. However, since A owns 55% of Y but only 45% of 2, his
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The Commissioner allocated to each corporation a surtax exemption of $12,500 for each taxable year involved and issued a notice
of deficiency to both NOVA and FAP, based on this allocation.
NOVA and FAP chose not to pay the deficiencies and instituted a proceeding for a redetermination of deficiencies of income
taxes. The Tax Court agreed with the Commissioner that the
ownership pattern of NOVA and FAP fell within the definition
of brother-sister corporations set forth in Treasury regulation
section 1.1563-1(a)(3),3 but found the regulation inconsistent with
the statute and hence invalid. The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals reversed per curium, adopting the Tax Court dissenting
opinion's reasoning4that the regulation is consistent with section
1563 and its legislative h i ~ t o r y . ~
stockholdings in the two are identical only to the extent of 45%. Similarly, B's stockholdings are identical only to the extent of 35%. Together A and B hold 80% each of Y and Z
and the 50-percent test is met. Thus, in this example, Y and Z are members of a brothersister controlled group. See HOUSECOMM.ON WAYSAND MEANS& SENATECOMM.ON
FINANCE,
91s~
CONG.,ST SESS.,TAXREFORM
STUDIES
AND PROPOSALS
U S . TREASURY
DEP'T,
pt. 2, a t 245-46 (Comm. Print 1969).
Example (2). If A owns 80% of Corporation Y and 20% of Corporation Z, and B owns
20% of Y and 80% of Z, the two tests would apply as follows:
Percentage of Stock
Ownership
Y
z

Percentage of Identical
Ownership

Shareholder:

A

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

B

. . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total

. . . . . . . .

100

100

40

As the table illustrates, A and B together own 100% of Y and 100% of Z. Thus, the
basic 80-percent ownership test is met. However, since A owns 80% of Y but only 20% of
Z, his stockholdings in the two are identical only to the extent of 20%. Similarly, B's
stockholdings are identical only to the extent of 20%. Together A and B hold only 40%
each of Y and 2, and the 50-percent test is not met. Thus, in this example, Y and Z are
not members of a brother-sister group.
3. Treas. Reg. 9 1.1563-1(a)(3) (1972). For relevant portions of the text of the Treasury regulation, see text accompanying note 36 infra.
4. Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, [I977 Adv. Sh.] STAND.FED.
TAXREP. (CCH) (77-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 86,250) 7 9163 a t 86,250-51 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1977)
(emphasis added):
The majority and the dissenting opinions [of the Tax Court] fully set out
the arguments supporting both interpretations of the statute, and there is no
need to repeat them here. We conclude that the dissent's interpretation of the
statute accords with the text of the statute and its legislative history.
Accordingly, for the reasons set forth in the dissenting opinion, we reverse the
Tax Court [and] uphold the validity of the regulation.
5. The Fourth Circuit and Tax Court holdings can be illustrated as follows. The
Commissioner included Joseph Ofano's stock ownership in his determination that FAP
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A. The Surtax Exemption
The corporate income tax consists of a normal tax, imposed
on all taxable income, and a surtax, which is added to the normal
tax? Section l l ( d ) exempts the first $25,000 of a corporation's
taxable income from the surtax.' Congress enacted this exemption in order to assist small businesses by reducing their taxes?
Under the effect of the exemption, however, large corporations
were able to obtain a greater tax benefit than were small businessesg by restructuring their organizations in order to generate
and NOVA satisfied the 80-percent and 50-percent tests of § 1563(a)(2).The Commissioner's determination was upheld by the Fourth Circuit:
Stock
Identical
Ownership
Ownership
FAP
NOVA
Shareholder :
Herbert
Ofano

. . . . . . . . . .

............

Total

............

100%

100%

55 C/c

The Tax Court held, however, that since Joseph Ofano held no stock in FAP, his ownership could not be counted for purposes of the 80-percent test:
Stock
Ownership
FAP
NOVA

Identical
Ownership

Shareholder :
Herbert . . . . . . . . . . . .
Total . . . . . . . . . . . .

100%

55 C-/C

55 70

Since William Herbert did not own at least 80%of NOVA, the stock ownership test is not
met and FAP and -yOVA are not members of a brother-sister group.
6. I.R.C. 6 ll(a). In both 1971 and 1972, the normal and surtax rates were 22% and
26% respectively. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, $121,78 Stat. 25, as amended,
I.R.C. Il(b)-(c).
7. I.R.C. # ll(d).
8. See, e.g., H.R. REP.NO. 2319, 81st Cong., 2d Sess. 26-27 (1950), reprinted in 19502 C.B. 380, 401; H.R. REP.NO. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 97 (1960). In 1971 and
1972, the surtax exemption reduced by $6,500 the tax of each corporate taxpayer with
taxable income of $25,000 or more.
9. Hearings on the President's 1963 Tax Message Before the House Comm. on Ways
and Means, 88th Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, at 160 (1963):
While it is apparent that, in a number of cases, the formation of multiple
corporations was without regard to tax considerations, other cases indicate a
strong tax motivation. This is indicated by the wide variation of tax savings
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multiple surtax exemptions.1°

I.

B. Statutory Methods for Dealing with the Abuse
Section 1551 prior to 1964

Prior to 1964, the Commissioner of Internal Revenue used
section 155111as a weapon against the abuse of forming multiple
corporations to avoid income tax.12 This section provided that
both the $25,000 surtax exemption and the accumulated earnings
credit13would be denied to any corporation transferring property
-

-

-

--

obtained from multi-corporate organization. In some instances the savings are
incidental, while in others they are substantial. Under the present tax structure,
the groups shown are subject to effective tax rates ranging from a low of 30
percent to a high of nearly 52 percent. The tax reductions resulting from multiple surtax exemptions range from a low of .4 percent to a high of 42 percent of
the tax normally applicable in the absence of multiple exemptions.
10. Several large enterprises split into several hundred corporations each. One corporation divided into 4,000 smaller corporations. Id. Such a division would have enabled an
enterprise to save over $2 million in taxes each year by taking advantage of over 4,000
surtax exemptions.
The tax benefits of multiple corporations have not been limited to the availability of
surtax exemptions. For a review of other benefits that have motivated the use of the
multiple corporate structure, see Geller, Tax and Non-Tax Motivation for the Creation
~ ~ON FED.TAX.
649 (1968).
and Utilization of Multiple Corporations, N.Y.U. 2 6 INST.
11. Revenue Act of 1951, ch. 521, Q 121(f), 65 Stat. 468-69, as amended, I.R.C. 6 1551:
If any corporation transfers . . . property (other than money) to another
corporation which was created for the purpose of acquiring such property or
which was not actively engaged in business at the time of such acquisitions, and
if after such transfer the transferor corporation or its stockholders . . . are in
control of such transferee corporation. . .then such transferee corporation shall
not for such taxable year . . . be allowed either the $25,000 exemption from
surtax provided in Q ll(c) or the $60,000 accumulated earnings credit provided
in paragraph (2) or (3) of Q 535(c), unless such transferee corporation shall
establish by the clear preponderance of the evidence that the securing of such
exemption or credit was not a major purpose of such transfer, . . . [Clontrol
means the ownership of stock possessing a t least 80 percent of the total value of
shares of all classes of stock of the corporation . . . .
12. Two other statutory tools used to disallow additional exemptions were # 269 and
Q 482. Section 269 provides that the Commissioner may disallow the exemption if a
corporation acquires property solely for the purpose of avoiding or evading federal income
tax. For examples of the application of Q 269 in this context, see Napsky v. Commissioner,
371 F.2d 189 (7th Cir. 1967),and Kessmar Constr. Co. v. Commissioner, 336 F.2d 865 (9th
Cir. 1964). Section 482 may not be used directly to disallow a surtax exemption. See
Challenger, Inc., 23 Tax Ct. Mem. Dec. 2096, 2112-13 (1964). However, 8 482 authorizes
the Secretary or his delegate to reallocate net income from one profitable corporation to
another if he determines that such an allocation is necessary to prevent evasion of taxes.
The effect of this reallocation may be the same as if the surtax exemption were disallowed.
See Kessmar Constr. Co., 39 T.C. 778, 796 (1963) (dictum), aff'd, 336 F.2d 865 (9th Cir.
1964).
13. The accumulated earnings credit increases the amount of earnings that a corporation may accumulate without subjecting itself to the accumulated earnings tax. I.R.C. §
535. See generally 1975 B.Y.U.L. REV.812.
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(other than money) to another corporation organized to receive
the property.14 This section of the Code granted an exception to
this rule if the transferor corporation could prove that securing
the exemption or credit was not the primary purpose of the transfer.
Section 1551 did not prove to be very effective in eliminating
multiple surtax exemptions for three reasons. First, the statute
only applied to transfers of property between corporations. It
could therefore easily be circumvented by having the stockholders rather than the corporation make the transfer to the newly
created multiple corporations.15Second, since the statute covered
only direct transfers of property, a corporation could circumvent
the statute with an indirect transfer? Third, corporations often
met the burden of showing that their transfers were motivated by
valid business reasons other than the securing of additional exemption~.'~
2. Revenue Act of 1964

In 1964 the Treasury Department attempted to persuade
Congress to disallow multiple surtax exemptions to all related
groups.18 Congress responded by enacting a new statutory
scheme, sections 1561 to 1563,19and by broadening the provisions
of section 1551.20
a. Sections 1561 to 1563. Sections 1561 and 1563 set forth
14. The statutory language leaves the impression that the surtax exemption or accumulated earnings credit may be disallowed only in the year of transfer. Both judicial
authority and the regulations indicate that the section may be used to disallow the exemption in the year of transfer and in any subsequent year. See Beacon Auto Radiator Repair
Co., 52 T.C. 155 (1969); Treas. Reg. § 1.1551-l(f) (1967).
15. See Airlene Gas Co. v. United States, 58-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 69,329, 69,332 (W.D.
Ky. 1958).
16. Id. For example, the transferor corporation would transfer money (not considered
"property" under the statute) to the new corporation, which would then use the money
to purchase property from the transferor corporation.
17. See, e.g., Melvin Asphalt Prods. Corp. v. United States, 66-2 U.S. Tax Cas.
87,196, 87,197-98 (S.D. Ohio 1966).
18. The impetus for change began with President Kennedy's 1963 tax message, in
which he urged Congress to eliminate the tax advantage available to large corporate
chains by limiting each affiliated corporate group to one surtax exemption. Hearings on
the President's 1963 Tax Message Before the House Comrn. on Ways and Means, 88th
Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 1, a t 14 (1963). The Treasury Department Proposal implemented the
President's suggested reforms. Id. a t 36, 76-82, 158-83.
19. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(a), 78 Stat. 116-25, as amended,
I.R.C. $8 1561-63.
20. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, § 235(b), 78 Stat. 125-27 (codified a t
I.R.C. § 1551).
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the general rule of this statutory scheme. Section 1561 limited
members of a controlled group of corporations to one surtax exe m p t i ~ n . ~The
' definition of a controlled group of corporations
included both parent-subsidiaryz2and brother-sister groups. Section 1563 defined a brother-sister group as a group of two or more
corporations, if an individual, estate, or trust owned 80 percent
or more of the voting power or total value of the stock of each
corporation in the
The new statute was substantially broader in application
than section 1551 had been. Whereas section 1551 had required
the Commissioner to show the existence of a transfer, subsequent
,~~
1561
control, and the formation of a new c o r p ~ r a t i o n section
applied to all controlled groups, irrespective of these additional
elements. And whereas the primary issue in section 1551 litigation had been the taxpayer's motivation, section 1561 did not
provide taxpayers the opportunity to prove that nontax considerations motivated their choice of corporate structure. The mere
fact of control brought them within the scope of the new provisions.
Although sections 1561 and 1563 blocked the taxpayer's main
escape routes under section 1551, section 1562 weakened the
scheme by providing that a controlled group could elect to claim
multiple exemptions at a cost of an additional 6 percent tax on
the corporation's first $25,000 of taxable income.25This election
provision effectively encouraged the use of the multiple surtax
exemption.26
b. Section 1551. The Tax Reform Act of 1964 also made
major changes to section 1551. First, the addition of section
l55l(a)(3) extended the application of section 1551 to indirect as
well as direct transfers. Second, section 1551 was broadened to
cover transfers made by "five or fewer individuals who are in
21. Section 1561 also limited a controlled group to one accumulated earnings credit
under § 535(c)(2)-(3) and one small business deduction under 0 6 8O4(a)(4), 8O9(d)(10).
I.R.C. § 1561(a)(2)-(3).
22. I.R.C. 0 1563(a)(l).As parent-subsidiary groups are beyond the scope of this case
note, the use of the term "controlled group" will refer only to brother-sister groups unless
otherwise indicated.
23. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 8 235(a), 78 Stat. 120, as amended,
I.R.C. § 1563(a)(2).
24. See note 11 supra.
25. Revenue Act of 1964, Pub. L. No. 88-272, 0 235(a), 78 Stat. 117-20, as amended,
I.R.C. 5 1562.
26. A corporation with a taxable income of more than $32,500 could pay the 6%
additional tax and still benefit from the use of the multiple surtax exemption.
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control of a c~rporation."~'
With respect to such transfers, section
1551(b) defined control of a corporation as
(2) . . . the ownership by the five or fewer individuals
[who transfer property] of stock possessing(A) a t least 80 percent of the total combined voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or a t
least 80 percent of the total value of shares of all classes
of the stock of each corporation, and
(B) more than 50 percent of the total combined
voting power of all classes of stock entitled to vote or
more than 50 percent of the total value of shares of all
classes of stock of each corporation, taking into account
the stock ownership of each such individual only to the
extent such stock ownership is identical with respect to
each such c o r p o r a t i ~ n . ~ ~

As enacted, the 80-percent and 50-percent tests contained an
ambiguity. The language of the tests did not specify whether the
stock ownership of someone who did not own stock in all the
corporations (and therefore was not figured in the 50-percent test)
could be counted for purposes of the 80-percent test. Treasury
regulations issued in 196729did not effectively deal with this issue
and thus left the question u n r e s ~ l v e d . ~ ~
3.

The Tax Reform Act of 1969

The subject of multiple surtax exemptions came before Congress again in connection with the Tax Reform Act of 1969. Congress amended section 1563 by adding a broader definition of
control.31The new definition used the identical language that had
been added to the section 1551 control requirement in 1964." The
legislative history of the new amendment made clear that its
purpose was to eliminate surtax exemption advantages for large
enterprises having multi-corporate structure^.^^
-

-

27. I.R.C. 5 1551(a)(3) (emphasis added).
28. Id. 5 1551(b)(2). For illustrations of the application of the 80-percent and 50percent tests, see note 2 supra.
29. Treas. Reg. 5 1.1551-1 (1967).
30. See White, The New Broader Sweep of Section 1551: An Analysis of IRSJ
Regulations, 28 J . TAX.100, 101 (1968).
31. Tax Reform Act of 1969, Pub. L. No. 91-172, 5 401(c), 83 Stat. 487 (codified at
I.R.C. $ 1563(a)).
32. See text accompanying note 28 supra.
33. STAFFSOF JOINTCOMM.ON INTERNAL
REVENUE
TAXATION
AND SENATE
COMM.ON
FINANCE,
9 1 s ~CONG.,ST SESS.,SUMMARY
OF H.R. 13270, THETAXREFORM
ACTOF 1969
(As PASSED
BY THE HOUSE
OF REPRESENTATIVES)
56-57 (Comm. Print 1969):
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Once again, the language defining control provoked questions of whether the stock ownership of individuals who did not
own stock in every corporation could be counted to satisfy the 80percent test.34In 1971, the Treasury Department issued a temporary regulation (now a final regulation) dealing directly with this
question," which defines a brother-sister controlled group as "two
or more corporations if the same five or fewer persons who are
individuals, estates, or trusts own . . , singly or in combination, stock [sufficient to satisfy the 80-percent and 50-percent
tests]."36 The first example following the regulation illustrates
the meaning of singly or i n combination:
Example (1). The outstanding stock of corporations P, Q,
R, S, and T, which have only one class of stock outstanding, is
owned by the following unrelated individuals:
Corporations
Individuals
.A

. . . . . . . . . .

B
C
D
E

. . . . . . . . .

P

Q

R

60'h
40%

GO'h

60'k.t

. . . . . . . . . . . .

.

40%

. . . . . . . . . . . . .

Total

. . . . . . .

-100%

. .

loo(/,

60%

100Yc

60 %

.

. . .

4OCk

. . . . . . . . . . . .

T

S

Identical
Ownership

. . .

100'/0

. . .

.

.

. . .

.

.

40 r/o

l0Ock

100%

60 ,4'

Corporations P, Q, R, S? a n d T a r e meinbers of a b r o t h e r - s i s t e ~controlled
o'soUP.:: 7
(1) Large economic units have been able to reap unintended tax benefits
through the use of multiple corporations. Often the only reason for using multiple corporations is to take advantage of the surtax exemption or the $100,000
accumulated earnings credit. This may lead to uneconomic practice and a great
waste of energy by taxpayers, their counsel, and the Internal Revenue Service.
By structuring a large economic unit so as to generate no more than $25,000 of
taxable income in each component corporation, the maximum marginal tax can
be held a t 28 percent instead of 48 percent, thus, avoiding tax of $5,000 for each
corporation.
(2) Even where there are good business reasons for using multiple but
related corporations they still should not be given the tax benefits designed for
small business.
(3) This provision will prevent the artificial incorporation of many companies that actually perform the same or similar operations under one management.
(4) Under the present law, large businesses, such as various chain stores,
are able to take advantage of the multiple surtax exemption while competing
smaller businesses in local communities are not. This presents an element of
unfair competition which the bill eliminates.
34. See text accompanying notes 29-30 supra. One commentator states that "[a]
consensus indicates that a controlled group does, in fact, exist" even if all individual
owners do not own stock in each member corporation. Shapiro, New Multiple Corporation
~ ~ON FED.TAX.567, 573 n.4 (1971). Other
Surtax Exemption Rules, N.Y.U. 2 9 INST.
commentators suggest that the consensus is that a controlled group should not exist. See
note 38 infra.
35. Temporary Treas. Reg. # 13.16-l(a), T.D. 7101, 1971-1 C.B. 269.
36. Treas. Reg. O 1.1563-l(a)(3)(i)(1972) (emphasis added).
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The thrust of the regulation is to include, for purposes of the 80percent test, the stock ownership of individuals who do not own
stock in each corporation and are therefore not counted for the
50-percent test (in the above example, individuals B, C, D, and

E)
Commentators attacked this temporary regulation as misinterpreting the language of section 1563 and its legislative history.3RNevertheless, when the Treasury issued proposedm and
final regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3) the wording remained the
same. This regulation has been repeatedly criti~ized;~'
but, until
the instant case, it has never been tested j u d i ~ i a l l y . ~ ~

The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals sustained Treasury regulation section l.l563-l(a)(3)' reversing per curium the Tax
Court's holding that a person must own stock in each member of
the brother-sister controlled group in order for his stock to be
counted for purposes of the 80-percent ownership test. Consequently, Joseph Ofano's 45 percent stock ownership in FAP must
be counted for purposes of the 80-percent test, even though he
owned no stock in NOVA.43Although William Herbert's ownership alone did not satisfy the test,44counting Joseph Ofano's ownership in FAP resulted in NOVA and FAP being members of a
brother-sister controlled group. The two corporations were thus
37. Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-l(a)(3)(ii)Ex. 1 (1972).
38. See Libin & Abramowitz, Multiple Corporations: A Surprising Interpretation of
Sec. 1563(a)(2) in Temporary Regulations, 2 TAXADVISER
326 (1971).
39. Proposed Treas. Reg. § 1.1563-l(a)(3),36 Fed. Reg. 17,869 (1971).
40. Treas. Reg. 5 1.1563-1(a)(3)(1972).
41. See, e.g., Bonovitz, Brother-Sister Controlled Groups Under Section 1563: The
80 Percent Ownership Test, 28 TAXLAW.511 (1975); Thomas, Brother-Sister Multiple
Corporations-The Tax Reform Act of 1969 Reformed by Regulation, 28 TAXL. REV.65
(1972).
42. Following the instant case, this issue was again raised in a Tax Court memorandum decision, which followed the rationale of the instant case in holding the regulations
invalid. T.L. Hunt, Inc. v. Commissioner, 35 TAXCT. MEM.DEC.
(CCH) 966 (1976), appeal
docketed No. 76-1894 (8th Cir. Oct. 18, 1976).
43. Contra, Fairfax Auto Parts of N. Va., Inc. v. Commissioner, 65 T.C. 798, 802-07
(1976), rev 'd per curiam, [I977 Adv. Sh.] STAND.FED.TAXREP. (CCH) (77-1 U S . Tax
Cas. 86,250) T[ 9163 (4th Cir. Jan. 28, 1977).
44. William Herbert's stock ownership satisfied the 50-percent test, but because he
held only 55% of NOVA'S stock, his ownership did not satisfy the 80-percent test.
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entitled to only one full surtax exemption for each year in disp ~ t e . ~ ~
The Tax Court had based its decision on an analysis of the
statutory language and legislative history of sections 1561 to 1563,
reasoning that neither the plain language of the statute nor the
clear thrust of the congressional committee reports and hearings
. ~ ~ Tax Court
supported the Commissioner's i n t e r p r e t a t i ~ n The
had further argued that sustaining the regulation would render
the 80-percent test meaningless, since the test's basic function is
to measure the financial interest of those individuals satisfying
the 50-percent control test.47Finally, the Tax Court majority had
ruled that Treasury regulation section 1.1551-1 did not represent
a viable interpretation of section 1563(a)(2), since the definition
of control under section 1551 varies according to whether a corporation is the transferee or transferor. Since the Commissioner had
not provided a method for determining whether FAP or NOVA
was the transferor, the Tax Court determined that section 1551
was not a p p l i ~ a b l e . ~ ~
The Fourth Circuit, however, rejected the Tax Court majority's rationale and relied upon the dissenting opinion's reasoning
to uphold the contested regulation. The Tax Court dissent set
forth three principal arguments. First, the language and legislative history of section 1563 support the Treasury interpretation
embodied in the regulation. This conclusion represented a reinterpretation of much of the same language cited by the Tax Court
majority.49 Second, Congress impliedly approved the contested
regulation when in 1974 it incorporated the regulation's definition
of a brother-sister controlled group into the Employee Retirement
Income Security
Third, Example (4) of regulation section
45. Contm, 65 T.C. a t 807.
46. Id. a t 802-05.
47. Id. a t 805-06.
48. Id. a t 806-07.
49. Id. a t 808-10.
50. I.R.C. § 414(b). The doctrine of statutory reenactment is based on the presumption that when Congress reenacts a statute, it has knowledge of the current interpretation
being given the statute. See, e.g., United States v. Ryan, 284 U.S. 167, 175 (1931). For
interesting commentary on the rule of statutory reenactment, see Brown, Regulations,
Reenactment, and the Revenue Acts, 54 HARV.L. REV.377 (1941); Feller, Addendum to
the Regulations Problem, 54 HARV.L. REV. 1311 (1941); Griswold, A Summary of the
Regulations Problem, 54 HARV.L. REV.398 (1941); Griswold, Postscriptum, 54 HARV.L.
REV.1323 (1941).
In the Tax Court case, the dissenters argued that when Congress incorporated by
reference § 1563 into 8 414(b) of the Code, it impliedly approved the interpretation of
§ 1563 given by the regulations. This argument has three potential weaknesses. First, the
assumption that Congress is aware of the current interpretation of a statute may have less
basis when Congress is using a statute by reference than when it is reenacting the statute
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1.1551-l(g)(4)illustrates the proper interpretation that should be
given the stock ownership test of section 1563."' The dissent interpreted Example (4) to indicate that the stock ownership of an
individual may be considered for the 80-percent test even though
the individual does not own stock in the transferee c o r p ~ r a t i o n . ~ ~

Since the Fourth Circuit opinion merely incorporates by reference the analyses of the Tax Court majority and dissent (finally
accepting the dissent's analysis), this note will focus on the lower
court opinion. This note does not, however, analyze the lower
court's treatment of the language and legislative history of section
1563. Rather, it focuses on the stock ownership test of section
1551, and examines the dissent's argument that section 1551 is
relevant to a proper analysis of the section 1563 ownership test.
Further, it analyzes the statutory language, legislative history,
and regulations defining the section 1551 stock ownership test.
Finally, the note examines the portion of the legislative history,
not treated by the Tax Court, that requires the adoption of the
stock ownership test of section 1551 into section 1563.
The narrow scope of this analysis seems justified when
viewed in light of the standard that must be met to overturn
regulations. The Fourth Circuit refused to overturn regulation
section 1.1563-1(a)(3)because the Tax Court dissent was able to
construct a persuasive argument in support of the regulation
based on the same language used by the Tax Court majority to
support its position that the regulation is invalid.53The regulation
itself. In this instance, since Congress' attention was focused primarily on the Employee
Retirement Income Security Act, it may not have reexamined the interpretation being
given § 1563. Second, regulation § 1.1563-1(a)(3)is relatively new and may not have come
to the attention of Congress. See United States v. Calamaro, 354 U.S. 351, 358-59 (1957)
(no evidence that Congress was aware of statute, 3-year-old statute didn't create such a
presumption). Third, the uncertain interpretation of § 1563 may render the doctrine
inapplicable. See Fred W. Smith, 25 T.C. 143, 146-47 (1955).
51. See note 68 and accompanying text infra.
52. 65 T.C. at 810.
53. See note 4 supra.
"Treasury regulations must be sustained unless unreasonable and plainly inconsistent with the revenue statutes . . . ." Commissioner v. South Tex. Lumber Co., 333 U.S.
496, 501 (1948). Merely showing, as did the Tax Court, that an alternative interpretation
of the statute has greater logic than the regulation is insufficient grounds for overturning
the regulation. See United States v. Correll, 389 U.S. 299, 306-07 (1967). The dissent's
success in constructing an argument in favor of regulation § 1.1563-1(a)(3) based on the
text and legislative history of § 1563 was probably the major factor influencing the Fourth
Circuit's reversal. The regulation, however, must also accord with the stock ownership test
of § 1551(b)(2). See note 54 and accompanying text infra.
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must withstand another test, however. Since Congress intended
the stock ownership test of section 1563 to be "the same test
employed in section 1551(b)(2) of the code, "54 regulation section
1.1563-l(a)(3) must also accord with the stock ownership test of
section l55l(b)(2). The following analysis of section 1551, therefore, will provide an independent measure of the reasonableness
and consistency of regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3).

A.

T h e Lower Court Dissent's Interpretation of Section 1551

The dissenting opinion of the Tax Court reasoned that
NOVA and FAP would constitute a brother-sister controlled
group under the stock ownership test of section 1551(b)(2). The
dissent argued that Example (4) of regulation section 1.1551l(g)(4) requires this result. The Tax Court majority acknowledged that under this interpretation of the example NOVA and
FAP would constitute a brother-sister controlled group, but only
if NOVA were deemed the transferor corporation. The Tax Court
then stated that the dissent's interpretation of section 1551(b)(2)
was not a proper interpretation of section l563(a)(2) "[s]ince
respondent [Commissioner] has pointed to no method of determining which corporation is to be regarded as the transferor

. . . ."55
The dissent's argument is pervasive on its face because,
as previously noted,56the legislative history of section 1563 explicitly requires the adoption of the ownership test of section
1551(b)(2).If the dissent correctly analyzed Example (4) of regulation section 1.1551-1(g)(4),it is clearly relevant, and the Tax
Court majority merely sidestepped the issue. If, however, the
dissent's interpretation was not correct, the Tax Court missed an
opportunity to strengthen its opinion by exposing the fallacy. It
is clear from the following analysis of section 1551, its legislative
history, and its regulations, that the dissent misinterpreted the
relevance of Example (4) and hence misconstrued the ownership
test of section 1551. Moreover, analysis of section 1551 reveals
that regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3) does not accord with the
ownership test of section 1551. The Fourth Circuit's reliance upon
the dissent was therefore misplaced.
54. H.R. REP.NO.413,91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 76 (1969); S. REP.NO.552,91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1969). This language likely originated with the Treasury Tax Reform
Proposal: "This definition [of a brother-sister controlled group] is the same as that under
COMM.
ON WAYS
AND MEANS
& SENATE
COMM.
ON FINANCE,
91s~
section 1551 . . . ." HOUSE
STUDIES
AND PROPOSALS
U.S. TREASURY
DEP'T,pt. 2, at 252
CONG.,ST SESS., TAXREFORM
(Comm. Print 1969).
55. 65 T.C. at 807.
56. See note 54 and accompanying text supra.
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B. T h e Stock Ownership Rule Under Section 1551
1.

-

T h e language of section 1551

In order for section 1551 to apply, the following three conditions must be satisfied: (1)there must be "five or fewer individuals who are in control of a corporation;" (2) these individuals
must "transfer . . . property . . . to a transferee corporation;"
and (3) "the transferor or transferors [must be] in control of such
transferee corporation . . . ."57
The language of section 1551 never explicitly states that the
"five or fewer individuals" who control the transferor corporation
must constitute the same group comprising the "transferor or
transferors" who must control the transferee corporation. The
Tax Court dissent interprets the language to mean that not all
of those who control the transferor corporation need to control
the transferee corporation to invoke the penalty of section 1551.
This argument suggests that the transferor or transferors comprise a subgroup of the five or fewer individuals, with not all
members of the five or fewer individuals necessarily belonging to
the subgroup.
Although not stated in its opinion, the Tax Court majority
position is consistent with the interpretation of the statute that
the five or fewer individuals and the transferor or transferors are
one and the same. Consequently, the stock ownership of an individual owning stock in the original corporation may not be
counted to fulfill the percentage tests unless he owns stock in the
transferee corporation as well. A careful reading of the language
introducing the section 1551 stock ownership test supports this
interpretation: "With respect to each corporation [the original
corporation and the transferee corporation] . . . [control
means] the ownership by t h e five or fewer individuals . . . [who
satisfy the 80-percent and 50-percent tests] ."" This language
states that the five or fewer individuals must satisfy the ownership tests with respect to each corporation. Taken in conjunction
with the requirement that the transferor or transferors control the
transferee corporation, it seems clear that the five or fewer individuals and the transferor or transferors must be the same individuals. Since the same ownership test must be met with respect
to both the transferor and transferee corporations by the same
individuals, it would violate the statutory language to consider
57. I.R.C. § 1551(a) (emphasis added).
58. I.R.C. § 1551(b)(2) (emphasis added).
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for purposes of the ownership tests the stock ownership of someone who does not own stock in both corporations. The legislative
history of section 1551(b)(2)also supports this interpretation.

2. Legislative history of section 1551(b)(2)
The legislative explanation of section 1551(b)(2) reads:
[Flor purposes of determining whether the transferor is considered to be in control of the transferee corporation, the individual
who makes the transfer, together with no more than four other
individuals, must own at least 80 percent of the value or voting
power of the stock in two or more corporations, one of which is
the transferee corporation, and the same individuals must own
more than 50 percent of the value or voting power of the stock
in each corporation (only taking into account identical stockholdings) after the transfer.59

Congress clearly intended the same individuals who satisfy the
50-percent test to satisfy together the 80-percent test with respect
to both corporations. An example following the legislative explanation illustrates this principle:
Individuals

Corporations
X
Y

The example concludes that both the 80-percent and 50-percent
tests are met.60Had Congress intended the test to be satisfied
even if B owned stock in only X or Y, it is reasonable to assume
that it would have chosen an example to illustrate this broader
application of section 1551(b)(2). Since it did not use such an
example, Congress apparently contemplated B's ownership in
both corporations.
The Technical Explanation of the Revenue Act of 1963 in the
House Committee Report on section 1551(b)(2) also supports a
narrow interpretation of the statutory language:
Paragraph (2) of Section 1551(b) provides that five or fewer
individuals are in control if such individuals own59. STAFFOF THE JOINTCOMM.ON INTERNAL
REVENUE
TAXATION,
SENATE
COMM.ON
FINANCE,
8 8 CONG.,
~ ~ ST SESS.,STAFFDESCRIPTION
OF H.R. 8363, THEREVENUE
ACTOF
1963, As PASSEDBY THE U S . HOUSEOF REPRESENTATIVES,
120 (Comm. Print 1963); H.R.
REP.NO. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. 123 (1963); S . REP.NO. 830, 88th Cong., 2d Sess. 155
(1964) (emphasis added).
REVENUE
TAXATION,
SENATE
COMM.ON
60. STAFFON THE JOINTCOMM.ON INTERNAL
FINANCE,
8 8 CONG.,
~ ~ ST SESS.,supra note 59, at 120-21.
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(A) at least 80 percent . . . of (i) the transferee
corporation, and (ii) a t least one corporation which such
individual (or individuals) controlled . . . before the
transfer, and
(B) more t h a n 50 percent . . . of e a c h s u c h
corporation, taking into account the stock ownership of
each such individual only to the extent such stock ownership is identical with respect to each such corporati~n.~'

The conjunctive subject "such individuals" clearly refers to "five
or fewer individuals." Such individuals must own 80 percent of
the stock of the transferee corporation and the corporation that
such individuals controlled before the transfer. Such individuals
must also satisfy the 50-percent test with respect to "each such
corporation." The explanation implies that each of the individuals must own stock in both corporations.
The example given in the Technical Explanation also supports this interpretation. The example illustrates the stock ownership of individuals A and B following a transfer:
Individual

Corporations
X
Y

These individuals satisfy the 80-percent test "since the same five
or fewer individuals (A and B) own more than 80 percent of the
stock of corporations X and Y as required under section
1551(b)(Z)(A). . . ."62

Treasury regulations under section 1551
Regulation section 1.1551-1provides the Treasury's interpretation of section 1551.63
a. Control. Subsection (e) of the regulation, entitled
"Meaning and application of the term 'control', " contains a definition of control similar to t h a t in regulation section 1.15631(a)(3)." One significant difference, however, is that regulation
section 1.1551-l(e) does not use the words "singly or in combination, " as does regulation section 1.1563-1(a)(3). The general defi-

3.

61.
62.
63.
64.

H.R. REP.NO. 749, 88th Cong., 1st Sess. A212 (1963) (emphasis added).
Id. at A212-13.
See I.R.C. 9 7805.
See text accompanying note 36 supra.
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nition of control in subparagraph l(e) is followed by the illustrative example set out below:
Example. On January 1, 1964, individual A, who owns 50
percent of the voting stock of corporation X, and individual B,
who owns 30 percent of such voting stock, transfer property
(other than money) to corporation Y (newly created for the purpose of acquiring such property) in exchange for all of Y's voting
stock. After the transfer, A and B own the voting stock of corporations X and Y in the following proportions:
Individual

A
B

. . . . . . . .
. . . . . . . .

Total

Corporation X
-50
30

Corporation Y

Identical
0,wnership

-

30
50

-

30
30

80

80

60

-

The transfer of property by A and B to corporation Y is a transfer described in [regulation section 1.1551-1(a)(3)] since (i) A
and B own a t least 80 percent of the voting stock of corporations
X and Y, and (ii) taking into account each such individual's
stock ownership only to the extent such ownership is identical
with respect to each such corporation, A and B own more than
50 percent of the voting stock of corporations X and Y.65

The fact that the example shows A and B owning stock in
both X and Y is evidence of the Treasury's intent to limit section
1551to common control under the 80-percent test. Since the regulations state the Treasury's interpretation of the Code, the courts
are reluctant to sustain any subsequent Treasury interpretation
of the Code that is broader than the regulation^.^' Therefore, if
the Treasury were to adopt a broad interpretation of control (e.g.,
that B need not own stock in both X and Y), regulation section
1.1551-l(e) would seemingly be the source of the interpretation.
The example used by the Tax Court dissent to substantiate its
interpretation of control, however, is not found in regulation section 1.1551-l(e). Rather, the example comes from subsection (g)
of the same regulation, which deals with transfer.
b. Transfer. Regulation section 1.1551-l(g), entitled
"Nature of transfer, " expresses the Treasury's interpretation of
65. Treas. Reg. § 1.1551-1(e)(3) (1967).
66. See Miller v. Commissioner, 333 F.2d 400, 402-03 (8th Cir. 1964); McCord v.
Granger, 201 F.2d 103,106-07 (3d Cir. 1952);Pacific Nat'l. Bank v. Commissioner,91 F.2d
103, 105 (9th Cir. 1937).
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the transfer requirement of section 1551. Paragraph (3) states:
"[Ilf one of five or fewer individuals who are in control of a
corporation transfers property (other than money) to a controlled
transferee corporation, the transfer is within the scope of section
1551(a)(3) notwithstanding that the other individuals transfer
nothing or transfer only money."67This paragraph illustrates that
to constitute a transfer under section 1551(a)(3),all members of
the ownership group need not transfer property. The paragraph
extends the definition of a transfer to cover situations where some
members of the ownership group are not involved in a transfer but
nevertheless own stock in the transferee corporation.
Paragraph (3) is illustrated by Example (4): .
Example (4). Individual A owns 55 percent of the stock of
corporation X. Another 25 percent of corporation X's stock is
owned in the aggregate by individuals B, C, D, and E. On June
15, 1963, individual A transfers property to corporation Y (newly
created for the purpose of acquiring such property) in exchange
for 60 percent of the stock of Y, and B, C, and D acquire all of
the remaining stock of Y. The transfer is within the scope of
section l55l(a)(3) .68

The example illustrates that even though B, C, D, and E did not
transfer property to Y, the transfer requirement of section
1551(a)(3)has been met. Transfer, however, is only one requirement of section 1551F TOdetermine if the control test has been
met, section 1551(b)(2) and regulation section 1.1551-l(e) must
be consulted. Based on their requirements, the same ownership
group would not control corporations X and Y, because E owns
.~~
the penalty provision of
no stock in Y c o r p ~ r a t i o nTherefore,
section 1551 would not apply.71
c. The Tax Court dissent's improper use of Example (4).
The dissent's interpretation of the stock ownership test of section
1551(b)(2)was based on the erroneous premise that Example (4)
of regulation section 1.1551-1(g)(4) illustrates the control requirement of section 1551. Instead, as explained above, the example
illustrates the transfer requirement. A separate subsection of the
regulations is devoted exclusively to the element of control.72The
67. Treas. Reg. 5 1.1551-1(g)(3) (1967).
68. Treas. Reg. 5 1.1551-1(g)(4) Ex. 4 (1967).
69. For the other requirements, see I.R.C. 5 1551(a).
70. See text accompanying note 64-65 supra.
71. It is difficult to understand why the drafters of the regulations would include an
example of the transfer requirement that does not also comply with the other requirements
of the section. Perhaps this inconsistency is due to oversight.
72. Treas. Reg. 5 1.1563-l(a)(3). See note 64 and accompanying text supra.
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text and illustrating example of this subsection do not support
the interpretation suggested by the dissent.73

C. Incorporating Section 1551 into Section 1563
Neither the language nor the legislative history of section
1563 makes any reference to the terms "transferor" or "transferee." The Tax Court dissent's explanation of the ownership test
under section 1551, however, is meaningful only if corporations
are characterized as either transferee or transferor corporations,
since the stock ownership test would apply differently with respect to each.74But since section 1563 provides for only a single
test of ownership to be applied with respect to all corporation^,'^
the determination of the transferor and transferee clearly has no
relevance to section 1563. Thus, the dissent's interpretation of
control renders meaningless the language of the House Report
that the "stock ownership test [of section 15631 would be the
same test employed in section 1551(b)(2)of the Code."76
The Tax Court majority's explanation, however, is not dependent upon characterizing a corporation as either transferee or
transferor. The control test applies identically with respect to
each. Thus, the Tax Court's interpretation preserves the plain
meaning of the House Report.
IV. CONCLUSION
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals' reliance upon the Tax
Court dissenting opinion's analysis was misplaced. Although on
their face the dissent's arguments appear pursuasive, an analysis
of the language, legislative history, and regulations of section
1551 does not support the dissent's interpretation. Further, the
legislative history requiring the adoption of the ownership test
of section 1551 into section 1563 is meaningful only under the
Tax Court interpretation. In light of the foregoing, regulation
73. See text accompanying notes 64-66 supra.
74. Treas. Reg. 5 1.1551-1(g)(4)Ex. 4 (1967) illustrates a transferee corporation, of
which individuals A, B, C, and D own 80%. The transferor corporation is owned by
individuals A, B, C, D, and E. Thus the example may be interpreted to support the
proposition that a subgroup (A, B, C, and D) of the transferor corporation's ownership
group may own the transferee corporation and still satisfy the control tests. However, the
example offers no support for the reverse proposition. For an interesting discussion of this
issue, see Bonovitz, supra note 41, at 528.
75. See note 2 supra.
76. H.R. REP.NO. 413, 91st Cong., 1st Sess., pt. 2, at 76 (1969); S. REP.NO. 552,91st
Cong., 1st Sess. 133 (1969).
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section 1.1563-l(a)(3) is clearly an inconsistent and unreasonable interpretation of section 1563 and should not have been
sustained on appeal.

